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Uncharted Terrain: The Intersection of
Privatization and Welfare
By Henry Freedman, Mary R. Mannix, Marc Cohan, and Rebecca Scharf
Welfare, a mainstay of legal services prac-
tice, is cutting edge again. Clients need
help negotiating a system that devolution,
discretion, and privatization have changed
radically. Public officials need help in this
new environment to "get it right," so that
programs achieve the laudable goals as-
cribed to them.
Privatization creates special challenges
for welfare advocates. New players, rang-
ing from neighborhood nonprofit organi-
zations to churches to multinational cor-
porations, are making decisions that affect
clients' vital interests. New legal issues,
ranging from state action to public con-
tracting compliance, can arise. Account-
ability and transparency, difficult to achieve
in the governance of traditional welfare
programs, become even more elusive.
We urge that legal services programs,
in deciding how to allocate their precious
resources, undertake advocacy involving
welfare privatization or at least consider
doing so. We know that many variables,
as well as local circumstances, determine
legal services priorities. Welfare pro-
grams, however, are the safety net of last
resort for many clients; absent vigorous
advocacy on their behalf, pressures to cut
public expenditures and contractors' spe-
cial interests may shape these programs'
overarching policies and daily practices,
while the voices and rights of legal ser-
vices clients are ignored.
In this article we review welfare pri-
vatization, identify some of the major issues
and challenges for the advocacy commu-
nity, highlight some experiences in partic-
ular states, and discuss some of the tools
and strategies advocates may wish to use.
I. Trends in Privatization of
Welfare Programs
Privatization generally refers to the array
of strategies-such as contracting for ser-
vices, the use of vouchers, and sale of pub-
lic assets-to transfer responsibility for
activities or functions from the government
to the private sector. The trend toward pri-
vatization has affected a wide range of gov-
ernment services from education and cor-
rections to municipal services and beyond.
As summarized below, private entities have
long had a role in the delivery of welfare
and social services. That role has shifted
over time as the government's role has
evolved, and changes made by the 1996
federal welfare law created a favorable cli-
mate for greater privatization. 1
For a broad historical perspective on the role of private entities in delivering social ser-
vices, see Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of PrIiatized Welfare,
89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 581-92 (2001). For a general review of social service privatization
trends, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-6, SOCIAL SERVICES PRIVATIZATION:
ExPANSION POSES CHALLENGES IN ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM RESULTS (1997).
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A. Role of Private Entities Before 1996
Both government and the private sec-
tor have been involved in providing for
families' basic needs since colonial days.
More than a century before the American
Revolution, private administration of wel-
fare ranged from direct aid to placing chil-
dren in private apprenticeships until they
reached their majority, and private chari-
ties were extensively involved in provid-
ing aid well into the twentieth century.2
The pendulum swung entirely to pub-
lic administration of welfare programs with
the enactment of the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program as
part of the Social Security Act of 1935. 3
AFDC, the predominant needs-based cash
assistance welfare program for families
until 1996, required administration by a
single state agency or by all political sub-
divisions in the state supervised by a sin-
gle state agency.4 It also required statewide
uniformity in program administration. 5 In
1939 Congress amended the Act to require
merit selection of employees. 6
Over the ensuing decades private
agencies focused on providing services,
often without regard to financial need.7
Religious charities began receiving in-
creased public funds for services.8 The
Kennedy administration's 1962 AFDC leg-
islation increased the role of contracted
services from nonprofit agencies, and
spending on services rose again after
Congress added Title XX to the Social
Security Act in 1981. 9
Traditional social service providers
offered counseling, training, child care, and
welfare-to-work services. For-profit com-
panies expanded into new areas of gov-
ernment contracting, such as child support
enforcement. Some, already giants in other
fields such as defense contracting, moved
into government services in general, includ-
ing welfare. Public officials' focus on pri-
vatization turned from a desire to expand
available services to reducing costs.10
In the early 1990s another profound-
ly important trend developed-the focus
on measuring performance, whether by
public agencies or private contractors,
and, in the case of private contractors,
basing payment upon performance
results. For example, Maine adopted leg-
islation that required all contracts to pur-
chase social services to be "based on mea-
surable performance indicators and
desired outcomes....
11
B. The 1996 Federal Welfare Law
Changes and Subsequent
Developments
Privatization took on new significance
in 1996 after Congress enacted the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act, which, among
other changes, replaced AFDC with the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) block grant. 12 The radical restruc-
turing of the state's role, the increased
emphasis on programs and services to
move people into employment, the grow-
2 Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 753-54 (Conn. 1995).
3 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 271, pt. IV (1935).
4 Id. §§ 402(a)(1), (3).
5 Id. § 402 (a).
6 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 379, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 401, amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(a)(5)(1939).
7 GILBERT STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY: THE POLITICS OF WELFARE 11 (1966).
8 1d. at 12-14.
9 1d. at 15; Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, Title XXIII, § 2352(a), adding 42 U.S.C.
§ 1397ff (1981).
10 Marguerite G. Rosenthal, Public or Private Children's Services? Privatization in Retrospect
7, at www.epinet.org/real-media/010111/materials/rosenthal.pdf (last visited Nov. 19,
2001).
l"ME, REV. STAT., tit. 22 § 12(a)(West 2001), http://janus.state.me.us/legis/statutes/
22/title22secl2-a.html; see generally BLAINE LINER ET AL., URBAN INST., MAKING RESULTS-
BASED STATE GOVERNMENT WORK (2000), available at www.urban.org.lhtml.
12 Pub. L. No. 104-193, tit. I, codtfled at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (2001).
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ing role of discretion in welfare adminis-
tration, and the elimination of the six-
decade-old requirements for public ad-
ministration and statewide uniformity,
taken together, created a new environ-
ment conducive to increased privatization.
As to elimination of the public admin-
istration requirement, the Act explicitly
authorizes states to use TANF funds "to
administer the TANF program through
contracts with charitable, religious, orpri-
vate organizations, and to provide indi-
viduals with vouchers redeemable by such
organizations. " 13 Much of this provision
and the public debates over it focused the
new policy on contracting with religious
organizations. 14 "Private" was clearly un-
derstood to include "for-profit."
The cumulative result of these changes
has been profound. A recent study of ad-
ministrative implementation of changes in
welfare programs observed:
More important than the overall
movements toward greater re-
liance on nonprofits, for-profits,
state labor departments, or some
other type of institutions has been
the shift toward greater depen-
dence on all of these institutional
types--often within the same state
and locality. Making these systems
work demands enormous invest-
ments in staff training, information
systems, contract negotiations, as
well as informal adjustments and
trust-building among diverse state
agencies, different levels of gov-
ernment, service providers, and
community organizations. 15
The elimination of the statewide uni-
formity requirement and the growth of
privatization and discretion in welfare
administration interact in a variety of
ways. 16 For example:
m They encourage local experimenta-
tion. Ohio sought guidance from Wendy's
fast-food-chain franchise model and then
opted to treat each county as a franchisee
working with an account manager at the
state level. The local "franchisee" con-
tracts for purchase of services from a vari-
ety of entities. 17
a They raise the prospect of increased
local arbitrariness or lawlessness. Scholars
studying the Minnesota program found
the uneven enforcement of sanctions by
counties around the state "troubling, even
in a state that emphasizes local discre-
tion."18 Even more troubling, a study in
Virginia found that discretion within a
county TANF program was exercised in a
racially discriminatory manner. 19
Beginning in the mid-1990s several
major initiatives took welfare privatiza-
tion to new lengths:
m In 1997 Wisconsin contracted with
for-profit, nonprofit, and county agencies
for the entire operation of Wisconsin
Works, or W-2, the program that replaced
cash assistance with a "pay-for-perfor-
mance" program. This was the first time
that private entities, including both for-
profit companies such as Maximus and
nonprofit organizations, made financial
eligibility determinations. 20
13 Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104 (emphasis added).
14 For information on litigation involving faith-based initiatives, see links to press releases
atwww.usc.edu/dept/LAS/religion-online/welfare/lawsuits.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2001); see also Alex J. Luchenitser, Casting Aside the Constitution: The Trend Toward
Government Funding of Religious Social Service Providers, in this issue.
15 Thomas L. Gais et al., The Implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, at
35 (2001) (on file with Henry Freedman et al.).
16 For an extensive discussion of this transformation and its implications, see Matthew
Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion and Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv.1121 (2000).
17 CAROL S. WEISSERT, LEARNING FROM LEADERS 25 (2000).
18 !d. at 134.
19 Susan T. Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal: Differences in Caseworker Support
Toward Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 HARv. J. AFR. AM. PUB. POL'Y 23-33 (1998).20 For more on the Wisconsin experience, see Karyn Rotker et al., Wisconsin Works--for
Private Contractors, That Is, in this issue.
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m Arizona entered into a contract with
Maximus for a pilot project that began in
1999; under the project Maximus adminis-
ters a TANF program with separate rules.2 1
m Texas sought to have the winning
contractor determine eligibility for a host
of benefits. Bidders included teams com-
posed of major corporations and state
agencies. The proposal engendered sub-
stantial political opposition and could not
be implemented because the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture and Department
of Health and Human Services did not
grant the necessary food stamp and
Medicaid waivers. 2
2
m Florida adopted legislation in 2000
that created Workforce Florida Inc., a
nonprofit corporation with primary
responsibility for the state's work-force-
related programs, including the work-
related TANF programs. Workforce Flor-
ida has the authority to make all work-
force policy for the state. 23
Privatization has also encountered
occasional setbacks. Most notably, in
Mississippi "pressing administrative and
implementation issues ultimately com-
pelled the state to recapture many wel-
fare system functions initially devolved to
the private sector."24 On the other hand,
President Bush's continued interest in
expanding "charitable choice" into areas
beyond TANF may induce more religious
entities to become involved. 25
As of the fall of 2001, we were not
aware of any comprehensive inventory of
the extent to which states and counties
have contracted with private entities to
deliver or administer TANF programs,
although the limited information available
to date suggests that privatization typi-
cally involves welfare-to-work programs
and related services. A forthcoming report
from the U.S. General Accounting Office
will examine the extent of contracting
with TANF funds.26
II. The Welfare Privatization Debate:
Key Players, Pros and Cons, and
Recent Experience
The extent to which TANF programs
should be privatized is the subject of
intense ongoing debate among social pol-
icy experts, academics, administrators,
advocates, legislators, and private enti-
ties. Efforts to privatize core TANF func-
tions such as eligibility determinations
and to contract with for-profit corpora-
tions have sparked the most public oppo-
sition. In the following discussion we
highlight the role of some key players in
the debate, the arguments for and against
privatization, and the recent experience
with privatization.
A. Key Players
The large for-profit entities that now
see welfare programs as a vast new source
of business and the nonprofit entities that
have historically been involved in deliver-
ing government services are the most obvi-
ous key players. Many advocates and their
allies are concerned that the growing
engagement of for-profit entities, driven as
21 For a summary of the Wisconsin, Arizona, and Texas initiatives, see Deborah Stein, Nat I
Ass'n of Child Advocates, Health Action '99: Privatization of Social Sernices, Overview of
Privatization of Basic Assistance Programs (Cash Assistance, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and
Child Care) (Jan. 1999) (on file with Henry Freedman et al.).
22 1d.
2 3 See Cindy Huddleston & Valory Greenfield, Privatization of TANF in Florida: A
Cautionary Tale, in this issue. For a brief background on Florida's 1997 privatization
attempt, see Stein, supra note 21.
24 SARAH F. LIEBSCHUTZ, MANAGING WELFARE REFORM IN FIVE STATES 43 (2000).
25 See Matthew Diller, Going Prtivate--the Future of Social Welfare Policy?, in this issue,
particularly the section entitled "The White House Faith-Based and Community
Organization Initiative,"
2 6 The report will also examine the "mechanisms for overseeing procurement and contrac-
tor performance, and related findings of noncompliance identified by auditors, comp-
trollers, and others who have examined contracting and contracted services." E-mail
from Mark Ward, senior social policy analyst, U.S. General Accounting Office, to Gina
Mannix, Welfare Law Center (Sept. 6, 2001).
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they are by the bottom line, will distort the
TANF program's mission to serve needy
individuals. 27 Major contractors include
n Affiliated Computer Services Inc.,
which bought Lockheed Martin IMS in the
summer of 2001 for $825 million. Ac-
cording to this contractor, "IMS partners
with more than 230 state and local gov-
ernment agencies in 45 U.S. States, the
District of Columbia, Canada, Australia,
and Europe. IMS specializes in child sup-
port enforcement, welfare and workforce
services, child care management, elec-
tronic toll collection.... ";28
m Citicorp Services Inc., which is a sub-
sidiary of Citigroup and is the largest oper-
ator of electronic benefit transfer programs;
it has contracts in more than thirty states.
On July 26, 2001, it signed a contract worth
hundreds of millions of dollars to deliver
food stamps and cash benefits throughout
California. It was the sole bidder;29 and
n Maximus, which its founder estab-
lished specifically to contract with gov-
ernments for welfare and other services.30
In the three months ending in June 2001,
Maximus' "government operations group"
reported monthly revenues of more than
$24 million.3 1 The company, which has
eighteen welfare-to-work program offices
and five disability service offices in ten
states, also contracts for child care admin-
istration, managed care enrollment, and
federal social security disability case man-
agement, assessment, and treatment refer-
ral services.
32
Nonprofit entities that administer
TANF services range from large organiza-
tions that have long delivered social ser-
vices to small local organizations, and they
may be more likely than for-profit entities
to share the governmental mission of assist-
ing low-income families. Many small non-
profit entities have secured contracts from
public agencies. Indeed, legal services
offices have themselves become contrac-
tors, obtaining TANF or other public fund-
ing for welfare-to-work services. 33
Traditional faith-based organizations are
receiving many contracts; examples include
$2.6 million to Catholic Charities in San
Diego, California, for CalWORKs (Calif-
ornia Work Opportunities and Re-
sponsibility for Kids) welfare-to-work ser-
vices over seventeen months and $366,000
to Northern Valley Catholic Charities in
Shasta County, California, for a mandato-
ry community service program.34 As the
opportunities for welfare privatization
expand, questions about the organizational
capacity of many smaller entities to do the
27 For the views of eighteen major nonprofit providers of social services expressing these
concerns and articulating principles of privatization, see Shay Bilchik, ed., The
Prioritization of Social Services: Where Do We Set the Limits on a Market-Driven Social
Services System? (on file with Henry Freedman et al.).
28 Press Release, Affiliated Computer Services Inc., ACS Completes Acquisition of Lockheed
Martin IMS (Aug. 24, 2001), at www.acs-inc.com/news/index.html (last visited Dec. 17,
2001).
29 Press Release, Consumers Union, California Signs Contract with Citicorp to Privatize
Delivery of Food Stamps and Welfare Benefits (July 31, 2001), at www.consumer-
sunion.org/finance/ebtwc70l.htm.
30 See www.maximus.com/public/virtual/investor/gmission. The slogan on Maximus' Web
site is "helping government serve the people."
31 Press Release, Maximus, Maximus Reports Record Revenues and Earnings: Net Income
Increases 30% on 23% Revenue Growth (Aug. 2, 2001), at www.maximus.com/public/
virtual/news/8-2-2001.
32 Bill Berkowitz, Applied Research Ctr., Prospecting Among the Poor: Welfare
Privatization (2001), at www.arc.org/welfare/prospecting.html.
33E.g., Community Legal Services in Delaware has a performance-based contract to obtain
expungements from criminal records to enable persons to obtain employment. Facsimile
(responding to Welfare Law Center inquiry) from Deborah Gottschalk, attorney,
Community Legal Services, to Welfare Law Center (July 27, 2001). Legal Action of
Wisconsin operates a Legal Intervention for Employment Project funded by a grant from
the Private Industry Council. See www.legalaction.org/life.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
3 4 CAL. COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, CHARITABLE CHOICE SURVEY, www.usc.edu/dept/ LAS/ religion
online/welfare/survey.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
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job well may be increasingly important.
Many smaller nonprofit entities that are not
capitalized to compete with for-profit com-
panies for the larger contracts now being
put out to bid are working instead as sub-
contractors to for-profit businesses. 35
Public employee unions, including
the American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees and Service
Employees International Union, also have
gotten into the act. They argue that the
government and its public employee
union members are most appropriately
Many advocates are concerned that
the growing involvement offor-profit
entities will distort the TANF program's
mission to serve needy individuals.
entrusted with carrying out core public
functions and with calling attention to the
need to invest in effective approaches to
improving welfare administration. 36
Advocates for low-income people
hitherto have not been so involved, ac-
cording to preliminary Welfare Law Center
inquiries. While advocates have joined
coalitions to oppose the more extreme pro-
posals to privatize eligibility determina-
tions, they appear less involved in imple-
menting privatization. This is not surprising
given the challenges of limited resources
and competing demands to address a wide
array of issues affecting low-income peo-
ple, the proliferation of contracts in some
places, government contracting often rais-
ing barriers to public participation, and dif-
ficult questions as to strategies to pursue.
B. The Arguments for and
against Privatization
The privatization debate typically
involves two related issues: how best to
deliver cost-effective, high-quality services
and how to promote accountability and
democratic participation in decisions relat-
ed to governmental programs. Low-in-
come individuals obviously have a high
stake in both issues. While most have far
too frequently experienced poorly admin-
istered public systems, that experience
alone does not justify privatization over
other reforms and investments in publicly
administered systems.
1. Delivering Cost-Effective, High-
Quality Services
The arguments in favor of privatiza-
tion center on the notion that privatiza-
tion promotes competition in the provi-
sion of services and that competition will
result in improved services delivered more
efficiently and effectively. Concerns that
government has done a poor job admin-
istering programs, that bureaucratic red
tape stifles effective administration and
innovation, and that rigid civil service rules
hinder administrators' ability to hire, retain,
and compensate talented staff typically
drive privatization proposals. Some argue
that privatization will reduce the costs of
delivering services. Government officials
sometimes see privatization as a solution
to budget pressures that prevent the hir-
ing of staff or as a relief from costly new
initiatives or as a way to secure specialized
skills. Privatization proponents often have
a philosophy that favors market-based
approaches over governmental solutions.37
35 Edward Skloot, Privatization, Competition and the Future of Human Sen'ices (Apr. 21,
1999), at www.surdna.org/speeches/private.html (speech delivered at the Annual
Conference on Foundations); see also RICHARD W. ROPER, ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV'T, A
SHIFTING LANDSCAPE: CONTRACTING FOR WELFARE SERVICES IN NEW JERSEY (1998) (Rockefeller
Reports).
36See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Safety Net for Sale, at xvww.
afscme.org/wrkplace/snettc.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2001) (the AFSCME Web site includes
detailed information on privatization generally and both public education and advocacy
tools); Privatization in Practice, Human Services, Proceedings: Redefining the Public Sector
Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Prit'atization, 28 FORDHAAM URIB. L.J. 1435,
1436-41 (2001) (remarks of Anna Berger of the Service Employees International Union).
3 7 See generally Demetra Smith Nightingale & Nancy Pindus, Urban Inst., Privatization of
Public Social Services, A Background Paper (Oct. 15, 1997), at www. urban.org.html.
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Critics challenge the notion that pri-
vatization is the way to achieve cost-effec-
tive service delivery. They contest the
assumption that market-based competition,
a predicate for the claimed benefits of pri-
vatization, exists in the welfare and relat-
ed social services area; they point out that
the factors necessary for true competition
are generally absent. These factors include
multiple buyers and sellers (sometimes
requests for proposals elicit only one bid),
low costs associated with entering the field,
adequate information to allow potential
bidders to make accurate determinations of
cost, and a standard product.38
Critics also contend that the quality of
services may actually decline under priva-
tization and that cost overruns, waste and
abuse, hidden costs to the government
(including the costs of effective contract
management and oversight), and the
potential for the contract process being
tainted with corruption and favoritism
undennine cost efficiency.39 When for-prof-
it entities are involved, the overarching
profit motive raises the specters of shortcuts
that reduce or deny services and "cream-
ing," or serving the easiest to serve.40
Some suggest that the public sector is
better at performing the complex tasks
associated with delivery of social services
in the pursuit of broad social goals and
that this indeed is a core function of gov-
ernment, while the private sector may be
better able to handle clearly identifiable,
standardized tasks such as data process-
ing and computer systems design.4 1 Thus
advocates and others have heightened
concerns about efforts to privatize key
functions, such as eligibility determina-
tions, sanction determinations, and poli-
cy making. 42
2. Accountability and the Public's
Ability to Participate in
Government
How are welfare administration deci-
sions and policies made? How can bene-
ficiaries secure fair treatment and enforce
rights to benefits and services? Privatization
restructures the framework for welfare pro-
gram delivery, changing it from a rule-
bound system-one subject to ad-
ministrative law, under which program
beneficiaries have clear legal rights, includ-
ing due process rights-to a contract-
bound system in which program benefi-
ciaries' rights and role are very unsettled.43
Proponents argue that privatization
enhances local control over service deliv-
ery by decreasing the role of more cen-
tralized government bureaucracies and
bringing the provision of services down to
the community level where local entities
are more in touch with local citizens and
responsive to their needs.44 Critics point
out that large for-profit entities are the
antithesis of local control and have huge
corporate structures unresponsive to local
needs. Even when local entities or non-
profit groups provide benefits and ser-
vices, the adequacy of their accountabil-
ity measures to assure community input
and acceptable performance, and in par-
38 For an analysis of this issue, see ASS'N OF CHILD ADVOCATES, DOES PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN
SERVICES PROVIDE THE BENEFITS OF MARKET COMPETITION? (2000), available at www.childad-
vocacy.org; see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 12, 30.
39 Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, supra note 36, gives examples in the
social services context to counter what the authors describe as the "myths" of privatiza-
tion. In New York City claims of corruption in the contract process involving Maximus
led to litigation challenging welfare-to-work contracts; the litigation was ultimately
unsuccessful. For an account, see Berkowitz, supra note 32 (detailing a range of com-
plaints about the performance of for-profit companies with welfare and related con-
tracts). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-41, SOCIAL SERVICES
PRIVATIZATION: ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES IN STATE CONTRACTING (1999).
40 Whether the contractor is a for-profit or nonprofit entity, the financial incentives built
into the contract are of great importance. See the discussion of the Wisconsin W-2 expe-
rience infra. Of course, the program's incentive structure also affects administration by
government agencies.
41 Nightingale & Pindus, supra note 37, at 11; Gilman, supra note 1, at 598-99.
42 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 16-17.
43 For a general discussion, see, e.g., Diller, supra note 16; Gilman, supra note 1.
44 Gilman, supra note 1, at 596.
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ticular whether they protect clients' rights,
is questionable.
A recent General Accounting Office
report identified several concerns, such as
an agency's lack of expertise in negotiat-
ing clear and specific contracts that assure
adequate performance. The report noted
that "monitoring contractors' performance
was often the weakest leak in the privati-
zation process."4 5 An examination of wel-
fare-to-work contracts in Baltimore bears
out these observations. In Baltimore flaws
throughout the contract process resulted in
$60 million worth of contracts producing
only 2,000 jobs for more than 10,000 TANF
recipients. This eye-opening look at the
contract process reveals the formidable
task that governments take on when they
contract out for services.4
6
Many also question whether privati-
zation can protect welfare recipients'
rights. How do private entities determine
clients' eligibility for services? Do they offer
a dispute resolution process? The General
Accounting Office notes the importance
of such procedures in contracts and of
other practices such as securing govern-
ment agency approval of sanctions when
the privatized program is responsible for
such decisions. However, the General
Accounting Office recognizes that imple-
menting client protections can be difficult
given governments' limited capacities to
negotiate and monitor contracts.
C. The Experience with Welfare
Privatization
While there have been some limited
studies of specific privatization efforts,
there has not been any overall evalua-
tion of the effects of privatization, and a
comprehensive effort may not be realis-
tic.47 Evaluations of welfare reform imple-
mentation typically examine a system in
which privatization is only one of numer-
ous elements. Examinations of specific
welfare privatization efforts are, howev-
er, instructive in considering other priva-
tization proposals.
First, the Wisconsin privatization ex-
perience shows the significance of a con-
tract's financial incentives. The initial
Wisconsin contracts allowed agencies to
retain a portion of unspent funds as prof-
its, both unrestricted and restricted (the
latter had to be spent on TANF individu-
als). 48 This linking of financial incentives
to unspent funds generated much criti-
cism from advocates, including those of
low-income groups, and others. During
the initial contract period $238 million out
of $651 million budgeted remained un-
45 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 14.
46 Barbara Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability anhd Diminished Democracy
in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 18 FORDHAMI URB. L.J.1559,
1602 (2001); see also Eileen P. Sweeney et al., Language Matters: Designing State and
County Contracts for Services Under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, in this
issue.
47 A General Accounting Office study reviewed privatization in child support enforcement,
a related program. It concluded that, in three comparisons, privatized offices performed
at least as well as and sometimes better than public child support enforcement agencies
but that cost-effectiveness results varied. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-4.
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: EARLY RESULTS ON COMPARABILITY OF PRIVATIZED AND PUBLIC
OFFICES (1996). For a discussion of how realistic comprehensive privatization efforts
might be, see Jessica Yates, Managing the Contracting Process for Results in elfare
Reform, WIN ISSUE NOTES, Dec. 1998, at 5-6, at www.welfareinfo.org/contractissue.htm.
For a discussion of privatization generally, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOiGGD
97-48, PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS LEARNED BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTs (1997): Id.
GAO/GGD -98-87, PRIVATIZATION: QUESTIONS STATE AND LOCAL DECISIONMAKERS U, FD \WHEN
CONSIDERING PRIVATIZATION OPTIONS (1998).
48 Wis. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, 01-7, AN EVALUATION OF WISCONSIN WORKS (W-2) PROGRAM
(2001), available at www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/windex.htm. Advocates argue that plan-
ning for spending community reinvestment funds should include the public. See Wis
Council on Children & Families, W-2 Surpluses and Comnnhit)' Input. ConlInIiti,
Reinvestment Funds (CR), CAPITOL COMMENTS, Apr. 2000, at 3 (on file with Henry
Freedman et al.). For another critical report see AM. FED'N OF STATF, COUNTY & MUN.
EMPLOYEES LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, PRIVATE PROFITS, PUBLIC NEEDS, available at
www.afscme.org/pol-leg/pppntc.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
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spent because of declining caseloads, and
contracting agencies retained some $65
million in unrestricted profits. Private con-
tractors were not required to disclose how
they spent these profits.49 The retention of
profits was very troubling to many in the
face of evidence that the Wisconsin wel-
fare reform effort was not moving families
out of poverty, that a wide variation in
sanction rates raised questions of equi-
table treatment, and that low-income peo-
ple found it difficult to access Medicaid
and food stamp benefits. 50 Criticism of
this payment structure led the state to
change future contract terms so that incen-
tive payments were related to specified
performance measures.
Second, certain private entities en-
gaged in financial mismanagement and
irregularities, which led the Wisconsin
Legislative Audit Bureau to recommend
that future contracts allow the state to
revoke the right of first selection for enti-
ties that fail to comply with financial and
other requirements. 5 1 Third, contracting
out oversight responsibility for Milwaukee
County, which serves most of the state's
TANF population, to the Private Industry
Council resulted in criticism that the Private
Industry Council performed poorly and
that the state did not make sure that the
council was fulfilling its responsibilities.
A preliminary report on the Arizona
TANF pilot project that involved three fac-
tors noted that determining the separate
effect of any one of the factors was not
possible. The factors were (1) privatized
TANF intake, eligibility, and employment
programs; (2) specific performance incen-
tives; and (3) significant changes in wel-
fare program rules. Nonetheless, the
report noted that "there is no strong evi-
dence that welfare families are either bet-
ter off or worse off under privatized
TANF. ' '52 Maximus, the for-profit con-
tractor operating the pilot project, recent-
ly received a $1 million incentive pay-
ment for meeting or exceeding contract
performance measures. 53 According to
Arizona advocates, during the summer of
Advocates must consider the consequences
of the shift in the legal ground rules
from those derived from administrative law
to those based on contract law.
2001 the Arizona Works Procurement
Board voted not to expand the project to
another county because of contract dis-
putes about the reimbursement rates for
eligibility determination. 54
Other reports compile press and
other accounts of troubled privatization
efforts, primarily involving for-profit com-
panies administering welfare programs.
These reports cite examples of poor per-
formance, financial irregularities, and dis-
satisfied program beneficiaries. 55
III. Strategies for Advocates
Privatization will likely remain part of the
landscape of welfare program adminis-
tration for the foreseeable future. Because
the question of privatized versus govern-
ment delivery is so entwined with ques-
tions of the quality of welfare program
administration and protecting welfare
recipients' interests, advocates cannot
ignore the challenge of developing strate-
gies for making a difference in clients'
lives under a privatized welfare regime.
4 9 Wis. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, supra note 48, at 5-6.
50 Id. at 86; see Wis. Council on Children & Families, Food Stamp Usage Doun: Good News
orBad, CAPITOL COMMENTS, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 1 (on file with Henry Freedman et al.).
51 Wis. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, supra note 48, at 42.
5 2 BOB KORNFELD, EVALUATION OF THE ARIZONA WORKS PILOT PROGRAM-IMPACT STUDY INTERIM
REPORT iii (2001).
53 Press Release, Maximus, Maximus Earns $1 Million Performance Bonus from State of
Arizona (Sept. 19, 2001), at www. maximus.com/public/virtual/news/9-17-2001.
54 E-mail from Eddie Sissons, William E. Morris Institute for Justice, to Gina Mannix,
Welfare Law Center (July 27, 2001).
55 Berkowitz, supra note 32; Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun, Employees, supra note 36.
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To serve most effectively, advocates
must consider the consequences of the
shift in the legal ground rules from those
derived from administrative law to those
based on contract law. Many of the legal
issues regarding protecting the interests
of low-income individuals under this new
framework remain unsettled. While advo-
cates have a wide range of legal and other
tools to consider (including policy advo-
cacy, coalition building, community edu-
cation, working with the media, moni-
toring, and litigation), part of the
challenge is to determine what tools make
the most difference for low-income
clients. The advocacy opportunities and
the appropriate strategies depend on fac-
tors unique to each state or locality-state
and local law, the political environment,
and the strength of potential allies. In
deciding how to approach welfare priva-
tization, advocates should also consider
whether advocacy in the context of other
privatization initiatives (e.g., Medicaid,
child welfare, and electronic benefits
transfer) offers useful lessons. In the fol-
lowing sections we delineate possible
advocacy strategies.
Advocacy around these new issues
can be rewarding for advocates in field
offices, specialized legal programs, poli-
cy advocacy organizations, and law
school clinics. First, involvement in the
early stages of privatization is a unique
opportunity to shape the program for
clients and establish the parameters for
privatization if the initiative proceeds.
Second, little law is established in this
area; advocates thus have an opportuni-
ty to make significant contributions to the
development of legal doctrine. Third,
many jurisdictions are likely to be exper-
imenting with privatization and the mod-
els advocates help shape may be repli-
cated elsewhere. Lessons learned from
unsuccessful experiences may be helpful
similarly in avoiding failures.
To be sure, advocacy in this area is
not easy. Not only are the legal issues dif-
ficult, but also the practical challenges are
formidable. The contracting process can
involve dozens of contracts, making
involvement difficult for advocates with
limited resources, even assuming they
have access to relevant documents. Key
decisions are often made out of the pub-
lic eye with advocates becoming aware of
repercussions only later when clients
report problems. Advocates may need to
develop new skills to work most effec-
tively in a contract-based environment.
They may be leery of involvement in a
resource-intensive process, such as devel-
oping contracts and monitoring imple-
mentation, where their ability to achieve
constructive improvements is unclear.
Nonetheless, advocates have already
worked creatively to make a difference,
and this work should encourage the
broader community. For example, Wis-
consin public interest lawyers have tack-
led privatization initiatives with strategies
such as strengthening nonprofit entities
that provide services, working with col-
laborative groups of stakeholders to iden-
tify problems and solutions, and monitor-
ing.56 Florida advocates, seeking to secure
due process protections for low-income
clients in work-force programs, recently
persuaded the state agency to instruct pri-
vate regional work-force entities to adopt
dispute resolution procedures. 57
A. Policy Advocacy
Policy advocacy, as we use the term
here, includes addressing policy issues at
all levels of government through means
other than litigation or individual repre-
sentation. It can involve coalition building,
community education, and advising low-
income groups. It can be conducted in
collaboration, as appropriate, with orga-
nized labor, academics, grass-roots orga-
nizations, good-government groups, and
nonprofit social service providers. While
each partner has its own constituency and
agendas, the challenge for the legal ser-
vices advocate is to forge or become part
of a coalition that has as a prominent fea-
ture protecting the interests of welfare
applicants and recipients.
56 See, e.g., Louise Trubek, Old Wine in New Bottles. Public Interest Lawyeing in an Era of
Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.1739 (2001).
57 See Huddleston & Greenfield, supra note 23.
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1. Whether and How to Privatize
The state or local government's
process for deciding whether to privatize
may be advocates' first opportunity to
become involved. In some states, large,
well-funded private contractors touting
their successes in other jurisdictions are
major players seeking policy change; in
other places, smaller nonprofit entities may
be key actors. Advocates may wish to
oppose privatization altogether, limit it to
certain activities, or focus solely on assur-
ing protections for low-income clients.
If privatization appears certain to go
forward, or if that is a course advocates
favor, advocates likely want clear criteria
established to determine the circumstances
for privatization to occur, what functions
are privatized, what the process is, and
what performance standards are in the
contracts. 58 Public involvement can be
built in, with requirements for notice and
comment for major policies, advisory
boards that include program participants
and advocates, and town meetings. Start-
up through pilot projects can be mandat-
ed. For example, Arizona used a pilot pro-
gram, created a procurement board with
various stakeholders, including commu-
nity-based organizations, participating, and
required independent evaluations. 59
Success depends on having access to
the governmental actors' planning. Ac-
cessing that information can involve
diverse tools such as monitoring plans sub-
mitted to legislative bodies, attendance at
public meetings, analyzing information
obtained through litigation, and working
with public sector unions.60 Accessing
information can also be accomplished
through an advisory committee or through
a "community congress," which would
meet regularly to receive input from TANF
recipients, legal services organizations, pol-
icy advocates, and low-income groups.
61
The advisory committee can collect rele-
vant research and then provide input into
the proposed requests for proposals, stan-
dards for performance, and contract per-
formance monitoring. Such a committee
would also increase the active participa-
tion of the affected community residents.
In California a legal services advocate
was invited to serve as a client represen-
tative on a state committee established to
oversee the design and implementation
of California's electronic benefit payment
system. He and other advocates also met
periodically with key state officials and
achieved notable results: the final con-
tract with Citibank requires that persons
be available by phone to answer ques-
tions in six languages and that the auto-
mated voice response system have twelve
languages. Final rules are expected to
establish standards on error resolution-
a problem that advocates learned from
other states. 62
We must remember that the legisla-
ture's or agency's goals, which may in-
clude efficiency, cost saving, and the
acquisition of specialized expertise, are
not antithetical to the advocate's interests
in insuring fairness for the clients. How-
ever, without advocates' involvement, the
legislature or agency is unlikely to give
58 So long as the food stamp and Medicaid programs require public administration of eligi-
bility determination and waivers are not granted too freely, the private role in welfare
will probably be concentrated in the provision of employment and social services, col-
lection of child support, and the like, and not eligibility determination or total program
administration.
59 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 46-341 to 46-345 (2001).
60 In New York City through pending litigation advocates first learned of the city adminis-
tration's plans to expand significantly the privatization of assessment services. Interview
with Marc Cohan, director of litigation, Welfare Law Center, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 29,
2001).
61 Bezdek, supra note 46, at 1609. Such a model is built into Maine's Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) legislation. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3789-D (West 2000),
establishing the Maine Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Advisory Council, which
must include at least two TANF recipients and representatives of organized labor and
women's interests. See http://janus.state.me.us/legis/statutes/22/title22sec3789-D.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
62Telephone Interview with Brian Lawlor, regional counsel, Legal Services of Northern
California (Oct. 23, 2001).
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priority to issues of fairness and due
process or build protections into the
authorizing legislation or policy to pro-
tect clients' rights after the contracts are
awarded. Points that advocates may want
to pursue include
0 retention of eligibility determinations
by governmental actors; to argue for due
process protections and to affect the out-
come through traditional advocacy are far
easier where the governmental actor
retains responsibility for deciding whether
to grant or terminate benefits, to impose
a sanction, or to deny supportive services;
* requiring governmental oversight; an
essential element in protecting clients' inter-
ests in a privatized welfare system is ensur-
ing that the governmental actor is required
to review private agency performance rig-
orously. 63 The governmental actor may
mandate audits and reports or empower
other branches of government to exercise
oversight over the contractor as if the con-
tractor were a government agency. For
example, Florida vests its auditor general
with authority to audit the private Work-
force Florida Inc. and provides that "the
Office of Program Policy Analysis and
Government Accountability, pursuant to
its authority or at the direction of the
Legislative Auditing Committee, may re-
view the systems and controls related to
performance outcomes and qualit of ser-
vices of Workforce Florida, Inc.";o and
* adoption of due process protections;
due process protections (notice, review
of adverse determinations by an impar-
tial official, administrative appeal process)
are critical. Advocates have identified
problems in this regard in Wisconsin's
fully privatized welfare system, even
though the state agency retains some right
to review decisions.65
2. The Formation of the Contract
Concerns regarding public contract
formation are typically over protecting the
taxpayer and the prospective contractor.
As one commentator notes, "Rules gov-
erning public procurement are imple-
mented principally to protect the integri-
ty of the competitive process. They are
not intended or designed as a means of
soliciting public input into policy."
66
Nonetheless, advocates can ensure
that the strategy of contracting out sup-
ports their clients' goals for the program.
For example, although many welfare-to-
work programs may be driven by nation-
al and state performance requirements,
other goals, such as reduction in poverty
or the creation of a well-trained work force
to meet the needs of the local economy,
can be enforced through performance
standards. Research and experience have
shown that requests for proposals that do
not contain sufficient detail regarding
expectations have later led to disputes and
inefficiencies. 67 The private agency should
be required to include in its request for
proposals a provision for performance
measures for different types of popula-
tions. The private agency also should
receive financial incentives to serve those
who are hardest to serve. 68
Much potential harm can be avoided
if advocates are able to ensure that the
legal rights and remedies available for
welfare recipients and the responsibilities
63 Government officials complain of the difficulties they claim are inherent in "writing clear
contracts with specific goals against which contractors can be held accountable." U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SERVICE PRIVATIZATION: EXPANSION POSEs CHALLENGES IN
ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM RESULTS 12, 14 (1997).
64 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 445.004 (West 2001).
65 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 49.152 (West 2001); see also Rotker et al., supra note 20.
66 Bezdek, supra note 46, at 1570.
67 Yates, supra note 47, at 5-6.
68 Baltimore contracts divided welfare recipients into three work categories-job ready,
"hard-to-place," and "severely challenged"-and required any request for proposals that
purported to serve "hard-to-place" TANF recipients to provide outreach, case managc-
ment, job retention, and postemployment services. Bait. Dep't of Soc. Servs , Family
Investment Program in Action 6 (1999). But see Bezdek, supra note 46, at 1581-1604, on
Baltimore's failure to achieve the results it sought through the contract process.
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and penalties for the private actor's non-
compliance are clearly set forth during
contract negotiations. Moreover, advo-
cates should work to develop both mech-
anisms that identify when contractors are
failing to fulfill their obligations and reme-
dies that compel compliance.
Advocates who want to help shape
the process to ensure that the best possi-
ble services are being delivered to those
in poverty must
n learn theprocess; most jurisdictions
have a procurement process that may or
may not conform to the American Bar
Association Model Procurement Code. 69
Whatever the process in the advocate's
jurisdiction may be, the advocate should
learn which contracts are subject to the
procurement process; the stages of the
process; the opportunities for input; and
who must sign off on the contract. The
last is of particular importance since inde-
pendent review by a different branch of
government may serve as a check on the
process;
* involve allies; as with the policy
process, collaboration with allies most
concerned with the prospect of privatized
services can be critical to affecting out-
comes. Contract procurement is typically
an unobserved process, not subject to
scrutiny, except by other entities that are
themselves not subject to public scrutiny.
Attention from good-government groups,
labor unions, the media, and nonprofit
organizations may influence the approval
process or cause the governmental enti-
ty to rethink the process; and
* acquire information about the pro-
posed contractor, scrutiny of existing con-
tracts in other jurisdictions may influence
the decision whether to privatize the ser-
vice and whether to award the contract
to a particular provider.
3. Monitoring Contract
Performance Effectively
While the advocate may not become
aware of a contract until after the ink has
dried, much effective work may still be
possible. The advocate can seek access
to contract-related materials. Traditional
access to information such as that found
under the federal Freedom of Information
Act is no longer clearly available, nor is
information to determine the effectiveness
of the systems created under contract.
70
Advocates can push for public dissemi-
nation of requests for proposals, contracts
The legislature's or agency's goals, which
may include efficiency, cost saving, and the
acquisition of specialized expertise, are not
antithetical to fairness for clients.
with primary vendors, independent eval-
uations, and periodic reports from the
contractor, particularly those used to jus-
tify payments or bonuses. Such dissemi-
nation may be fostered by creating report-
ing requirements for local governments,
appointing an ombudsperson with pow-
ers of inquiry, and conducting public
hearings.
71
B. Litigation
Whether litigation can shape privati-
zation or address problems resulting from
privatization is uncertain. Advocates need
to consider the following issues.
69Bezdek, supra note 46, at 1571; see Am. BAR ASs'N, MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2000).
7 0 See Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public Right to Know: The Debate Over Pritatizatio;1
and Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U.L. RE%. 825 (2000);
see also id., Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Anialsis of Public
Access to Private Entities under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21 (1999), for a discus-
sion of the need for federal courts to adopt broader definitions of agency to allow for
greater access to information to the public.
71 See Bezdek, supra note 46, at 1608, for a discussion of ways to "incentivize'" local gov-
ernments and their contractual partners to give information about the contract process
Trubek, supra note 56, at 1746.
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1. Using Litigation to Shape
Privatization
Because much of the process of wel-
fare services privatization unfolds behind
the scenes between parties other than
low-income recipients and their repre-
sentatives, and because courts are often
loathe to look behind a governmental
actor's decision to privatize services, liti-
gation is rarely the most effective tool to
shape or prevent privatization. 7 2 How-
ever, by familiarizing themselves with
local laws and contracting procedures,
advocates can have success with litiga-
tion. For example, in Giles v. Horn, plain-
tiffs challenged contracts for CaIWORKs
case management services entered into
between San Diego County and private
contractors. 73 The county's charter re-
quired it, before entering into a contract,
to determine that the contractor could
provide the services more economically
and efficiently than county employees.
The court found that the board of super-
visors did not have the power to create
exceptions to the county charter. It fur-
ther found that the purported exceptions
did not apply to the CalWORKs case
management contract and that a state
statute barred the wholesale contracting
out of case management in the welfare
system to independent contractors. The
court ordered defendants to terminate the
contracts.
74
A taxpayer lawsuit can serve as an
additional litigation handle, but it is like-
ly to be successful only where the contract
violates a constitutional or statutory pro-
tection 75 In certain situations, litigation
over contract formation may take place
between branches of government. For
example, in New York City, the city
comptroller delayed the city's entry into
several welfare-to-work contracts and,
although ultimately unsuccessful on
appeal, succeeded in forcing media atten-
tion on the contracting process.
76
2. Protecting Individual Rights
The legal rights of recipients of pri-
vatized TANF services vary considerably
with the action challenged and the role
of the private actor. For example, until
1996, eligibility and benefit processing
was the work of a single state agency.
Now some states and localities are con-
tracting out such work. Below are some
issues to consider before commencing a
challenge under this emerging paradigm.
a. State Action
Due process and other constitution-
al protections apply only to state actors.7
Administrative procedure acts and public
information laws are similarly commonly
inapplicable to private contractors. The
challenge thus is to convince the court to
treat the contractor as a state actor. A com-
plete discussion of the various tests to
determine when there is state action is
beyond the scope of this article. 78 How-
ever, the closer the private entity's func-
tion is to one that (1) would have been
actionable if performed by a governmen-
tal entity and (2) was traditionally and
exclusively performed by the state, the
72 Bezdek, supra note 46, at 1570.
73 Giles v. Horn, No. 99-733081 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County Oct. 24, 2000).
74 Defendants are reportedly appealing the court's order.
75 Bezdek, supra note 46, at 1572.
76 See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Judge's Ruling Bars Contracts in Welfare Plan, NY TIMES, Apr. 14,
2000, available at www.legis.state.wi.us/senate/sen04/news/article2000-16.htm.
77 See The Civil Rights Cases, 10 U.S. 3, 10-14 (1883); Milburn v. Anne Arundel County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922 (1982), for a delineation of the Supreme Court's two-prong test for deter-
mining whether actions taken by a private entity should be considered "state action" for
purposes of constitutional protections; David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized
Welfare System, 64 BRooK. L. REV. 231 (1998).
78 For a more detailed discussion of the issue of state action as applied to privatization, see
Steve Hitov & Gill Deford, The Impact of Privatization on Litigation7, in this issue;
Gilman, supra note 1, at 635; Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Actioni Doctrine for an Age of
Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 (1995).
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more likely that the court will find the
entity to be a state actor.79 Applying this
analysis, aggrieved applicants and recip-
ients should be able to challenge eligibil-
ity determinations and sanctions rendered
by private contractors to the same extent
as when those decisions are undertaken
by a local governmental actor.
b. Contract Remedies
Litigation concerning the obligations
of the private contractor may also be dif-
ficult because the welfare applicant or
recipient is not a party to the contract.8 0
However, the client may argue that she
is an intended third-party beneficiary of
the contract and therefore possesses cer-
tain rights. 8
1
c. Direct Challenges That
Implicate Privatization
Litigation that attacks the legality of
welfare agency practices may directly or
indirectly involve private entities and
expose their role in contributing to the
challenged practices. For example, a
Massachusetts lawsuit against the welfare
agency and a private contractor respon-
sible for disability determinations claimed
that the benefits of class members were
improperly denied, reduced, or terminat-
ed as a result of illegal denials of disabil-
ity exemptions. The court granted pre-
liminary relief barring the agency from
reducing or terminating grants for those
whose disability exemption denials led to
impositions of time limits or work sanc-
tions until after the current contractor
reviewed the exemption request. The
court found that the contractor denied
exemptions because of class members'
failure to respond to a confusing letter
and that denying exemptions for this rea-
son violated the state requirement for fair
and equitable administration. While the
lawsuit was targeted primarily at the state
agency, it also exposed problems with
the contractor. 82 Plaintiffs entered into a
separate settlement with the contractor in
which it agreed not to seek state contracts
for five years.8 3
Another successful Massachusetts
lawsuit against the TANF and child sup-
port enforcement agencies secured pro-
cedures to assure that sanctioned indi-
viduals who wanted to cooperate with
child support enforcement could get their
sanctions lifted. After the state contracted
with Maximus for child support enforce-
ment services, erroneous sanctions in-
creased, compounding problems for indi-
viduals who could not get the state
agencies to lift the sanctions. Once the
lawsuit was filed and before the final set-
tlement was reached, the defendant agen-
cies agreed to rescind sanctions involv-
ing Maximus. The state subsequently
terminated its contract with Maximus but
did not publicize its reasons.84
Notwithstanding these successes,
postviolation litigation may be very unsat-
isfying since, in addition to the other
impediments to litigation, advocates bear
the burden of convincing a court that
plaintiffs have legally enforceable rights
against the private actor. Instead, to the
extent possible, advocates should take
steps to ensure that the legal rights and
79 Gilman, supra note 1, at 612.
80 Id. at 635.
81 For a fuller discussion of third-party beneficiary rights, see Hitov & Deford, supra note
78; Gilman, supra note 1, at 635; see generally Ernest M. Jones, Legal Protection of Third
Party Beneficiaries: On Opening Courthouse Doors, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 313 (1977). A good
analysis of these issues arises in the public housing context where tenants successfully
obtained expanded rights. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981).82 See Diller, supra note 16. Welfare advocates should look behind the private contractor
and determine whether government officials contributed to any procedural malfeasance,
such as failing to monitor private contractors.83 Thibault v. Dep't of Transitional Assistance, Civil Action No. SUCV97-04740C (Mass.
Super. Ct. Suffolk County Dec. 29, 1998) (Clearinghouse No. 52,295); Telephone
Interview with Brian Flynn, Greater Boston Legal Services (Nov. 5, 2001).84 DeJesus v. Dep't of Revenue, Civil Action No. 98-59946 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk County
Mar. 8, 1999) (Clearinghouse No. 52,293); Flynn, supra note 83.
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remedies available to welfare applicants
or recipients, along with the private actor's
responsibilities and penalties for non-
compliance, are clearly set forth during
contract negotiations.
PRIVATE ENTITIES WILL CONTINUE TO BE MAJOR
players in welfare programs for the fore-
seeable future, and legal services advo-
cates will be representing clients who
depend upon fair treatment from those
entities. The Welfare Law Center is devot-
ing its energy to working with local advo-
cates on issues arising from increased
devolution, discretion, and privatization
in each community, sharing strategies for
seeking more positive outcomes, and
developing plans to respond in their com-
munities.
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